Financial Sector Assessment

Investor and Policyholder Protection Schemes

Related to the second element of safety net, deposit insurance, are investor and policy­holder compensation schemes, which are designed to promote investor confidence in the functioning of financial markets and to protect policyholders from the failures of financial institutions. They are present in many jurisdictions and form one component of the range of measures adopted by industry associations, self-regulatory organizations (such as stock and futures exchanges), and national authorities. Most schemes are designed to provide some degree of compensation for investors who incur losses from the insolvency or other failure of a member firm; some schemes also provide compensation for losses arising from fraud or other malfeasance on the part of the intermediary or its employees. All schemes have a cap on claims—in absolute terms or as a proportion of the loss incurred or both.

Investor compensation schemes generally cover customer accounts in which a range of investment activities—defined in the respective licensing laws and broader regulatory regimes—take place. Compensation schemes generally do not cover losses on the part of the investor as a result of poor investment advice or management by member firms, although in some schemes, compensation may be available where a causal relationship is established between the poor investment advice or management and the inability of the firm to meet claims made by clients.

In most jurisdictions, the compensation scheme is statutory in nature; however, it may take a variety of forms. Although compensation funds are set up by contract, the obliga­tion to set up and to be a member of one are often in statute. In some cases, schemes are constituted as nonprofit member organizations, whereas, in other cases, the scheme is arranged on the basis of a company operating a fund on behalf of an exchange, the exchange being the principal shareholder of the company. In certain jurisdictions, there are schemes in which trusts—organized on behalf of the various dealer associations and exchanges that are acting as the trust’s sponsoring organizations—provide for compensa­tion arrangements. The compensation fund also may be established as a separate company administered by the regulator.

The majority of investor compensation schemes are tailored to individual investors and small business; in some cases, institutional investors are afforded equitable treatment under the terms of the scheme. Generally, the claims cap of the scheme is consistent with the type of investor covered by the arrangements; jurisdictions that provide for both retail and institutional claimants in their schemes have caps that are generally higher than those for compensation schemes that are targeted at retail and small business investors. Some schemes provide for a minimum level of compensation, although the majority set limits on the maximum payment in the event of a successful claim.

Funding arrangements for investor compensation schemes rely to a large extent on levies on member firms. Where levies are imposed, they are generally calculated according to factors such as the gross revenue and net capital of member firms. Other factors may also be taken into account in assessing contributions, including the risk profile and level of activity of the firm. Some schemes set a minimum balance for the fund and have spe­cific arrangements to ensure that the minimum balance is maintained. In some jurisdic­tions, the scheme does not provide for a reserve fund; rather, levies are raised according to projected costs of the scheme in a given year and calculated on an annual basis. Provisions are usually made in the scheme’s rules to ensure that additional funds can be raised in the event of a major default or likely shortfall in funds caused by increased claims.

The adequacy of investor protection measures depends on the full range of regula­tory responses in place to minimize investor losses and to protect customer assets in the event of the failure of an intermediary. Those measures include (a) procedures to effect the orderly winding up of a failed intermediary, (b) provisions for the regulator to restrain conduct on the part of a failing or failed firm and to direct the appropriate management of assets held by the intermediary, and (c) capital adequacy requirements that are sufficient to facilitate the protection of customer assets in the event of a firm becoming insolvent. Adequate transparency of the regulator—with respect to the steps taken to deal with the failure of market intermediaries—can promote investor confidence.

Some of the emerging good practices of compensation schemes are noted here. Compensation schemes should be independent and transparent in their operations. They should have open and constructive relations with related agencies or functions—such as a supervisor or an ombudsman or any relevant part of the dispute resolution mecha­nism—and industry representatives. Compensation schemes should be industry-funded to emphasize that prudential and fiduciary responsibility lies with industry participants. The degree of government backing is likely to vary between jurisdictions, but such back­ing may increase moral hazard to market participants. Prefunded schemes offer greater certainty of compensation, but pay-as-you-go schemes may be perfectly adequate in dis­ciplined markets. The latter type of scheme (and to a lesser extent, the former) may be required to borrow from time to time. The terms and conditions of this borrowing should be subject to clear limits. Funding levies are usually set at a flat percentage of income. The rate may vary from sector to sector, by size of contributor, or by the degree of financial health of the contributor.

Compensation is made on the defined event of failure or almost certain failure of a financial service provider. Compensation is typically subject to an upper limit that is appropriate for the type of product or market and commensurate with the level of funding. Compensation could be limited to retailers or small, unsophisticated commercial consum­
ers, and the extent to which foreign consumers of domestic products should be compen­sated should be appropriate to the type of market. Most notably, if a market purports to offer products on an international basis, then compensation should be payable to foreign consumers. Finally, the scheme should adhere to good corporate governance practices, follow strict investment guidelines, and be subject to audit.

Policyholder protection funds act as a financial safety net, often after other avenues for redress have been exhausted (e. g., the bankruptcy process). These funds act to main­tain public confidence in the industry by protecting the interest of small entities or uninformed customers and by ensuring a smooth exit mechanism for failing companies. Finally, protection funds help to level the playing field across different sectors.6